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accomplish the fulfillment of the right. Where the loss which may result from
the effort to legally enforce a right is substantially greater than the loss which
results from compliance with a wrongful demand, the will is surely overridden.
There is no freedom of choice; only a choice of evils. To deny recovery and
thereby upheld the extortion is to deny an effective protection for the con-
tractual rights, and to encourage the breach.25
By its decision in this case, the Ohio court not only went against the
weight of authority by not recognizing the doctrine of business compul-
sion, but it also is encouraging breach of contract under similar circum-
stances.
25 Id. at 472.
REAL PROPERTY-CONDEMNATION OF NON-SLUM
AREA FOR PRIVATE REDEVELOPMENT
The plaintiffs, sixty-eight home owners, brought suit for a declaratory
judgement that, a section1 of the New York General Municipal Law, was
unconstitutional on its face and as it applied to a proposed redevelopment
project in an area in which the plaintiffs lived. The challenged section
authorizes cities to condemn, for the purpose of reclamation and redevel-
opment, predominantly vacant areas which are economically dead with
the result that their existence and condition impairs the sound growth of
the community. The section states that if one or more of the noted con-
ditions exist, 2 the planning commission, after public hearings, may desig-
nate the area as one requiring redevelopment and that the municipalities
may use the power of eminent domain, if necessary, to clear, replan, and
redevelop the vacant land. The question presented to the court was
whether this statute, which allows the condemnation of an area which is
substandard but does not contain tangible physical blight, is unconstitu-
tional because it allows a private use of condemned land which is not an
actual slum. In effect the statute allows the use of the power of eminent
domain for private industrial purposes. The court held that an area in a
city does not have to be a slum in order to make its redevelopment a pub-
' N.Y. GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW AR'ncLE 15, S 72n.
2 Subdivision of the land into lots of such form, shape, or size as to be incapable of
effective development; obsolete and poorly designed street patterns with inadequate
access; unsuitable topographic or other physical conditions impeding the development
of appropriate uses; obsolete utilities; buildings unfit for use of occupancy as a result
of age, obsolescence, etc.; dangerous, unsanitary or improper uses and conditions ad-
versely affecting public health, safety, or welfare; scattered improvements which, be-
cause of their incompatibility with an appropriate pattern of land use and streets, retard
the development of the land. GErNERAL MuNICIPAL LMV ARTICLE 15 S 72n subd. 1, pars.
a and b.
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lic use, nor is a public use negated by the fact that poorly developed
vacant land is to be used for industrial purposes. Cannata v. City of New
York, 11 N.Y. 2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395 (1962).
The power of eminent domain, as we know it today, is believed to have
been invented by Grotius in 1625, and was used to designate the power
of a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking of, any property
within its jurisdiction for public use. The exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain is subject to limitations in the Constitution of the United
States and of the constitutions of the several states. The power of the
states is restricted in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, which states: "no state shall deprive any person of life,
libery, or property without due process of law." Article I of the New
York Constitution forbids he taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. A similar statement can be found in most
other state constitutions. Some of the state constitutions do not specif-
ically mention the fact that private land may not be taken for private use
but simply state that land may not be taken without due process of law.
The taking of land by a state for a private use is enough to be considered
a deprivation of property without due process of law.3
Thus, one of the greatest and most complex problems ever to face the
courts in the field of eminent domain has been the one of interpretation
of the words "Public Use." It is generally agreed that the legislature has no
power, in any case, to take the property of one person and hand it over
to another without some reference to a "Public Use."4 There is not a
concrete definition of "Public Use" and its interpretation seems to vary
with the circumstances and to be controlled by necessity. Two theories
which seem to enjoy the most popularity are the "Public Use Theory,"
which limits the application of eminent domain powers to public owner-
ship and employment, and the "Public Benefit or Public Advantage The-
ory," which only requires that the property taken be used for some public
benefit without regard to ownership. One of the jurisdictions which ad-
heres to the "Public Use" theory has said "there is a distinction between a
public use and a benefit to the public."5 The jurisdictions which give the
term "Public Use" a liberal interpretation have stated that the term is
synonymous with public benefit and, if the municipal agency can prove
S Gilman v. Tucker, 128 N.Y. 190,28 N.E. 1040 (1891).
4Richards v. Wolf, 82 Iowa 358,47 N.W. 1044 (1891).
5 Smith v. Cameron, 106 Ore. 1, 210 Pac. 716 (1922). Accord David Jeffrey Co. v.
City of Milwaukee, 267 Wis. 559, 66 N.W. 2d 362 (1954). See generally, Cooley, CoN-
STITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 760-764 (7th ed. 1903).
6 State v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority, 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W. 2d
44 (1954); Contra, Housing Authority of City of Atlanta v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74
S.E. 2d 891 (1953).
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some public benefit or advantage, the constitutionality requirement has
been met: The right to take private property for public use. without the
owner's consent lies dormant in a state until the legislature of that state
passes a statute which defines the purpose, method, and agency to be
used in the exercise of eminent domain appropriations. 7
New York and Illinois are considered to be "Public Benefit" states, but
it is interesting to note that New York was cautious in earlier years with
its interpretations of "Public Use" and the requirements were strict. An
example of this is the fact that the legislature of New York has never
exercised the right of eminent domain in favor of "mills" of any kind.8
The use of eminent domain authority in the construction of public
projects such as parks, 9 canals, 10 and highways" has always been recog-
nized as a valid public use. There has even been an extension to the con-
struction of parking lots where the parking situation was acute.' 2 The
real awakening of the power of eminent domain, however, came after
World War II when the United States Congress passed the Housing Act
of 1949.1a This law made federal funds available to local government
agencies for the rehabilitation and redevelopment of slum areas. The
purpose of the act was to rid cities of their slums and to construct low-
cost housing for public occupancy.
The advent of renewal projects brought to the courts a rash of suits
seeking to have state enabling statutes declared unconstitutional. All but
three of the many states which have passed such statutes have had their acts
upheld upon judicial review.14 A major contention of property owners,
even in jurisdictions where the term is loosely interpreted, was that there
was to be no "Public Use" of the land. The courts have answered this
7 It is interesting to note that a telephone company, Doty v. American Telephone
and Telegraph Co., 123 Tenn. 329, 130 S.W. 1053 (1910); a public service corporation,
Minnesota Canal and Power Co. v. Pratt, 101 Minn. 197, 112 N.W. 395 (1907); and a
railway, Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 60, 25 Pac. 147 (1890) have all
been, at one time or another, agencies with the power of eminent domain.
8 Hay v. Cohoes Company, 3 Barb. 43 (1848) (one of the earliest uses of the power
of eminent domain was the condemnation of the lands of individuals for mill sites,
where, from the nature of the country, such mill sites could not be obtained for the ac-
commodation of the inhabitants without overflowing the lands thus condemned).
9 Yarborough v. Park Commission, 196 N.C. 284, 145 S.E. 563 (1928).
10 Dalles Lumbering Co. v. Urquhart, 16 Ore. 67, 19 Pac. 78 (1888).
11 Opinion of the Justices, 330 Mass. 713, 113 N.E. 2d 452 (1953).
12 Amsterdam Parking Authority v. Trevett 174 N.Y.S. 2d 832 Supreme Ct., Special
Term, Montgomery County (1958).
13 STAT. 413 (1949); 42 U.S.C. §S 1441, 1451-60 (1952).
14 Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.F. 2d 280 (1956). Housing Authority
v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E. 2d 891 (1953); Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So.
2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
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allegation by declaring the elimination of slums a public benefit in itself
and, therefore, a "Public Use." The prevention and control of disease,
crime and immorality is a public benefit. 5 Even jurisdictions which sub-
scribe to a strict interpretation of "Public Use" have allowed redevelop-
ment through condemnation, but they require strict public control
throughout the entire redevelopment plan.16
Once the public use has been established, subsequent disposal of the
property, as long as it does not negate the purpose of the taking, is im-
material. 17 An incidental benefit to private parties does not serve to de-
feat the enabling act."' 8
New York was one of the first states to recognize the elimination of
slums as a "Public Use" when in New York City Housing Authority v.
Muller'9 it was agreed that the replacement of unsanitary housing condi-
tions with sanitary conditions was a "Public Use." This decision is espe-
cially significant when we notice that it was handed down in 1936, thir-
teen years before any federal housing aid was available. This decision was
further substantiated in 1944 when in Stuyvesant Housing Corp. v. Stuy-
vesant Town Corp. the court said:
having opened the door to a broad concept of Public Use, our courts have
extended the doctrine of eminent domain from public housing to slum clear-
ance and redevelopment of substandard and blighted areas, and to the pro-
viding of public parking facilities."120
The facts in the Cannata21 case are unusual in that the area to be con-
demned consisted 75% vacant land, and a majority of the remainder
contained dwellings and other commercial buildings which were not
within the definition of slums-i.e.; structures which are substandard or
unsanitary.2 2 The main argument of the city of New York in the Can-
15 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Crommett v. City of Portland, 150 Me. 217,
107 A. 2d 841 (1954); Herzinger v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 203 Md. 49,
98 A. 2d 87 (1953); In re Slum Clearance in City of Detroit, 331 Mich. 714, 50 N.W.
2d2340 (1951).
16 Foeller v. Housing Authority of Portland, 198 Ore. 205, 256 P. 2. 752 (1953).
17Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A. 2d 612 (1950); State v. Land
Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. of K.C., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W. 2d 44 (1954);
Contra: Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
Is Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E. 2d 884 (1943).
19 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E. 2d 153 (1936).
2
oStuyvesant Housing Corp. v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 51 N.Y.S. 2d 19, Supreme
Ct., Special Term, New York County, (1944).
21 Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y. 2d 210, 182 N.E. 2d 395 (1962).
22 It is interesting to note that the area being contested is to be used for industrial
firms which have themselves been displaced by a housing development. Brief for Ap-
pellee, p. 22, Cannata v. City of New York, id.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
nata23 case was that the prevention of slums is as an important a public use
as the elimination of slums and that the area in question, although then
free from physical blight, would slowly deteriorate into a slum and would
adversely affect the public health, safety, and general welfare. 24
In the noted case, the New York Court of Appeals relied heavily upon
an Illinois case, Gutknecht v. City of Chicago,25 in which the Illinois Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Urban Community Con-
servation Act of 1953 .28 This act had as its purpose the prevention of
slums, and it authorized local conservation boards to take steps designed
to prevent the spread of slum and blight to new areas. This was one of
the first times a court stated that the prevention of slums was a sufficient
public purpose to allow the use of eminent domain powers on an area
which history shows will become slum in the future. The Gutknecht 2l
case was reaffirmed in Zisook v. Maryland Drexel Neighborhood Rede-
velopment Corp.28 when the Conservation Act was again challenged and
again upheld. In 1956 the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated: "previ-
ously we reserved judgment with respect to blighted open area. We now
express the opinion that the redevelopment of such an area is a public
purpose. '29
The decisions discussed in the previous paragraph were the basis for
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the Cannata8" case.
The court said that the legislature's purpose in passing the challenged
statute was the prevention of slums and that the prevention of slums is a
sufficient public use as required by the Constitution. Once the public use
is defined and agreed upon, the subsequent disposal of the land is imma-
terial.
We have seen, in a few short years, an expansion of the power of emi-
nent domain from a dormant position in our lives to a most important
one. We have authorized the use of eminent domain for housing projects,
elimination of slums, and now, for the prevention of slums. The power
has been used on areas of tangible blight, physical deterioration, and now,
on open areas which are impairing or arresting the sound growth of a
23 Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y. 2d 210, 182 N.E. 2d 395 (1962).
24 The area in question is a pocket of predominantly vacant, littered, small, excessively
subdivided, unmaintained lots, many of which are two to ten feet below actual or
mapped street levels, and are ungraded, unpaved and unlighted.
25 3 111. 2d 539,121 N.E. 2d 791 (1954).
26 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 671, S 91.8-91.16 (1953).
27 Gutknecht v. Cityo f Chicago, 3 111. 2d 539, 121 N.E. 2d 791 (1954).
28 3 111. 2d 570, 121 N.E. 2d 804 (1954).
29 Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 760, 763, 135 N.E. 2d 665, 667 (1956).
30 Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y. 2d 210, 182 N.E. 2d 395 (1962).
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community. Even though a recent case ' stated that agricultural and resi-
dential lands which are economically sound could not be condemned by
the Port Authority of Seattle for an industrial project, the overall trend
seems to indicate that some day the "Public Use" requirement may be met
by a showing of a greater benefit from the new use than was being re-
ceived from the old.
81 Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P. 2d 171 (1959).
TORTS-MINOR HELD TO ADULT STANDARD
A thirteen year old defendant, Paul Erickson, with his mother's per-
mission, drove the family pickup truck to meet a friend, Lawrence John-
son. The boys were returning home in their own vehicles after a com-
pleted day of swimming. Erickson was following 100 to 150 yards behind
the Johnson car at a speed of between 30 to 35 miles per hour along a
dusty road. The plaintiff, Fannie Betzold, traveling in an opposite direc-
tion, was unable to see the road because of the dust raised by the oncom-
ing Johnson car. Consequently, she stopped alongside a ditch on the right
side of the road. The plaintiff testified that the defendant's truck, which
was swaying to the right and to the left, went off the road into the ditch
colliding head-on into the plaintiff's automobile. The jury found that the
defendant was not guilty of negligence after the instruction that the
defendant was to be measured by the degree of. care "which an ordi-
narily prudent child of his age, experience, intelligence and capacity
would have exercised ... under the same or similar circumstances." The
appellate court held that the instruction was "decisive of this case" and
reversed the decision saying that under these or similar circumstances the
only standard of care the defendant could be judged by is the standard of
care required and expected of licensed drivers. Betzold v. Erickson, 35
11. App. 2d 203, 182 N.E. 2d 342 (1962).
Thus stands a somewhat unique problem. In what instances is an adult
standard applicable to a minor who is charged with actionable negligence?1
There is no precedent for the Betzold decision in Illinois. However, in
1 The most common situation involving a minor is when the question is whether or
not he is guilty of contributory negligence. The great weight of authority shows that
in these instances a child is only required to use the degree of care that an ordinarily
prudent child of the same capacity would use in the same situation. Allen v. Colaw, 27
Ill. App. 2d 304, 169 N.E. 2d 670 (1960); Molnar v. Slattery Contracting Co., 8 N.Y.
App. Div. 2d 95, 185 N.Y.S. 2d 449 (1959); Bolar v. Maxwell Hardware Co., 205 Cal.
396, 271 P. 97 (1928); Maskaliunas v. C&W I.I.R.R., 318 Tll. 142, 149 N.E. 23 (1925). It
is unusual for a minor to be charged with actionable negligence as compared to the
number of cases involving a minor's contributory negligence.
